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PROPERTY-MEETING THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF No-
TICE TO MORTGAGEES IN TAX SALES. Mennonite Board of Missions v.
Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
Alfred Jean Moore purchased real property from the Mennonite
Board of Missions (MBM) by executing a $14,000 promissory note se-
cured by a mortgage on the real property. The mortgage required
Moore to pay all property taxes assessed against the property. Al-
though Moore continued to make mortgage payments to MBM, she
neglected to pay the property taxes.
Under Indiana law,1 when property taxes are delinquent for more
than fifteen months, the property can be sold at a tax sale. The statu-
tory provisions require notice of the sale by posting and publication,'
and notice by certified mail to the property owner.3 Prior to 1980, how-
ever, neither notice by mail nor personal service was given to the mort-
gagee of property being sold for delinquent taxes.4
In accordance with these tax sale statutes,5 Elkhart County, Indi-
ana, instituted proceedings in 1977 to sell Moore's property for delin-
quent taxes. Notice was posted at the courthouse, published in the local
newspaper, and mailed to Moore. MBM did not receive notification of
these proceedings. On August 8, 1977, the property was sold to Rich-
ard Adams and neither Moore nor MBM made any attempt to redeem
the property.6
MBM learned of the tax sale on August 16, 1977, after the right
to redeem the property had expired. Adams sought to quiet title to the
property in himself, whereupon MBM alleged that the tax sale was
invalid since it had received neither notice of the pending tax sale nor
notice of the right to redeem. The trial court ruled that the Indiana
1. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-24-1 (1978). ("Real property on which property taxes have been delin-
quent for fifteen [15] months . . . is eligible for sale.
2. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-24-3 (1978).
3. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-24-4 (1978). See First Say. & Loan Ass'n of Cent. Ind. v. Furnish, 174
Ind. App. 265, -, 367 N.E.2d 596, 600 n.14 (1977). Under Indiana law, a mortgagee was not
considered to be a property owner for purposes of these statutes. Id.
4. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (1983). A 1980 addition now requires notice by certified mail to
all mortgages of tax delinquent property, provided the mortgagees make an annual .request for
such notice and agree to pay the expenses incurred in mailing such notice.
5. IND. CODE §§ 6-1.1-24-1 to 6-1.1-24-12 (1978).
6. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-25-1 (1978), provides for a two-year period of redemption during which
the owner or "other person who has an interest" in the property may redeem the property by
paying the purchase price plus expenses.
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statute was valid, and the judgment was affirmed by the Indiana Court
of Appeals.7 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the stat-
ute was held to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment since it deprived mortgagees of an interest in property without
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
To guarantee that every person is accorded due process of law, two
fundamental requirements must be fulfilled. First, it has been consist-
ently held that a person is entitled to some notice of proceedings that
can deprive him of his property.8 This axiom, considered to be so self-
evident that it can not be given additional weight by any citation of
authority,9 is based on the notions of fairness, justice, and an opportu-
nity to be heard.1"
The second fundamental requisite of due process of law is that a
party be given an opportunity to be heard."1 To satisfy this require-
ment, some form of notice of the proceedings must be afforded to inter-
ested parties.1 2 In determining what constitutes due process of law with
respect to the adequacy of notice under the fourteenth amendment,1 3
the traditional analysis draws a distinction between actions in personam
and actions in rem.1 4
Traditionally, in actions in personam, the sovereign's power was
exercised directly over the person.15 Personal service on a defendant
within the state was generally required before there was sufficient juris-
diction to adjudicate his personal liability, a rule which applied
whether the defendant was a resident or a non-resident.16 As a result, it
7. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. App. 1981).
8. Wiswall v. Sampson, 55 U.S. 52, 67 (1852).
9. Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900).
10. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 750-52 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (there must be notice of
a tax assessment and an opportunity to be heard); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233
(1864) (parties are entitled to be heard after proper notification); Hagar v. Reclamation District,
111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884) (notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential). See also Note,
Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1257 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Requirements of Notice].
11. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
12. Id. at 393. Be it through personal service, publication, mailing, or any other manner
prescribed by the law of the state.
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
14. See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). See
also Fraser, Actions In Rem, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 29, 46 (1948).
15. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). See also Note, Requirements of Notice, supra
note 10.
16. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 727.
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was extremely difficult to subject a non-resident defendant to a per-
sonal judgment."
On the other hand, in actions in rem, a court's jurisdictional basis
rested on its power over the subject of adjudication itself."8 Such ac-
tions dealt with the status or title to property within the territorial lim-
its of the state, and judgments issued thereupon were considered to be
binding against the whole world.' 9 The rulings handed down in pro-
ceedings in rem seemed to indicate that notice by publication alone was
sufficient as to all defendants, whether residents or non-residents, whose
identities and addresses were unknown.2 0 Further, even where the
names and addresses of non-residents were known, notice by publica-
tion appeared to be sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements. 1
In accepting the traditional view that notice by publication was
sufficient in all proceedings in rem, 2 there was little discussion of the
adequacy of such notice, since publication satisfied the requirement
that some form of notice be given .2 The justification for such minimal
notice requirements stemmed from the notion that since the state al-
ready had jurisdiction over the res, the purpose of notice was merely to
give interested parties an opportunity to be heard, or to warn them that
the res was under litigation. 4
But even this minimal requirement of publication was an advance-
ment from the earlier concept of the state's power over the res. Prior to
the publication era, the mere seizure of the thing itself had been con-
sidered sufficient to impart notice. 28 Thereafter, it became necessary to
give some form of notification of the proceedings beyond that arising
from mere seizure.2 In particular, notice was expected to convey the
time and place where an appearance had to be made, although the
Court reaffirmed that the precise manner utilized to impart such infor-
17. Comment, Sufficiency of Notice Under the Requirements of Due Process, 34 MARQ. L.
REV. 120 (1950).
18. The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815).
19. Fraser, supra note 14, at 46 (1948).
20. Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71 (1909) (notice by posting and publication held sufficient
as to non-residents). See also Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
21. E.g., Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889) (state's inter-
est was too important to allow the absence of owner to keep it from adjudicating on property
within its territorial limits).
22. Fraser, Jurisdiction By Necessity, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 307-09 (1951).
23. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 751 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
24. Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
25. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870) (equating seizure of the property
with the levy of a writ of attachment); The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815).




mation would not be strictly dictated, as long as some notice was
given.27
In Pennoyer v. Neff,2 the United States Supreme Court declared
that constructive service (posting and publication) was never sufficient
against a non-resident defendant in an action in personam. 9 However,
the Court upheld notice by publication in proceedings in rem, main-
taining that such notification provided the only method for states to
validly adjudicate a non-resident's interest in local property.30
After the decision in Pennoyer, the Court adhered to the notion
that service by publication was sufficient to meet the due process re-
quirements of notice to non-resident defendants in proceedings in
rem.31 However, there were still occasions where fairness and justice
demanded more than the mere compliance with the minimal require-
ments of publication. 2 At such times, the Court would seek to deter-
mine whether "substantial justice" had been accorded. 3
As the Court became more concerned with the fulfillment of "sub-
stantial justice, '3 4 there occured a gradual expansion and strengthening
of notice requirements0--a move toward notice reasonably calculated
to give actual notice. 6 The Court began to take an interest in the
probability of a party actually receiving the notice that was provided. 7
This expansionary trend is illustrated by the Court's ruling in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.38 In Mullane, where
the Court invalidated Central Hanover's attempt to provide notice by
publication to the beneficiaries of a common trust fund, the Court con-
cluded that "process which is a mere gesture is not due process. 39 In
27. Id. at 279.
28. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
29. Id. at 727.
30. Id.
31. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890) (quiet title action); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. &
Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889) (condemnation of land for a railroad).
32. Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900) (five days held an unreasonably short time for
response).
33. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (notice by publication insufficient where it
was known that defendant had left the state intending not to return).
34. Id.
35. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (allowed service at defendants usual abode in
state and personal service in another state at the same time); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927) (allowed out of state service by registered mail).
36. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928).
37. Id. at 24.
38. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
39. Id. at 315.
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detailing the requirements of due process," the Court voiced its strong
lack of confidence in notice by publication41 and held that such notice
was inadequate where the party's name and address were known or
easily ascertainable.42
Since the Court refused to classify the action in Mullane as either
in rem or in personam,43 the case came to be viewed as the beginning
of the demise of the traditional distinctions between these two forms of
actions. 44 Taking this as an indication that Mullane was to be given a
broad interpretation and an equally broad application, 5 the Court did
not hesitate to extend the principles enunciated in Mullane to bank-
ruptcy proceedings, 46 eminent domain actions, 47 and even to proceed-
ings involving the termination of utility services.48
Irrespective of these advancements regarding in rem proceedings,
the area of tax assessments and sales continued to be excepted from the
customary notice practices.49 Notice by publication alone usually had
been sufficient in tax sale proceedings involving non-residents or un-
known owners.5 0 Further, there was a series of cases indicating that
notice by publication and posting would be sufficient even with respect
to known residents.5 1
The justifications for treating tax proceedings differently could be
traced to the idea that such proceedings were intended to be summary
in fashion 52 and, further, that it was considered to be in the public
interest to allow the government to collect its revenues without undue
delay.53 An additional justification, the "caretaker theory, '54 suggested
40. The Court said that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably calculated . . to apprise interested parties of the pen-
dency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 339 U:S. at 314.
41. "Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small
type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper . 339 U.S. at 315.
42. Id. at 318.
43. Id. at 312-13.
44. Note, Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication, 32 IND. L.J. 469, 470-72 (1957).
45. Note, The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings, 84 YALE
L.J. 1505, 1508-09 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Notice by Publication].
46. New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
47. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112 (1956).
48. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
49. Note, Requirements of Notice. supra note 10, at 1266.
50. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907).
51. Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908) (published notice of delinquency); Leigh v.
Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904) (delinquent taxes); Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159
U.S. 526 (1895) (taxed land erroneously omitted from tax rolls).
52. Note, Requirements of Notice. supra note 10, at 1266.
53. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 752 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
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that a property owner should keep himself abreast of the status of his
property."6 As such, notice was normally considered to be sufficient if
the time and place of the hearing was designated. 56
After Mullane, although there seemed to be a reluctance to extend
the principles enunciated therein to tax sale proceedings,6 7 the Court,
in Covey v. Town of Somers, 8 indicated a willingness to analyze such
cases in accordance with the Mullane standards to insure that due pro-
cess had been accorded. 59  In addition, although state courts in
Oklahoma, 0 Oregon, 61 and New York62 declined to apply the dictates
of Mullane, state courts in Michigan, 3 Kansas, 4 and Arizona15 ap-
plied the Mullane principles to hold notification of tax sales by publica-
tion unconstitutional. 6 Thus, although tax sale proceedings had tradi-
tionally been excepted from the customary notice requirements, 6 7 the
rationale in Covey and the state court decisions discussed above indi-
cated that an analysis in light of the fundamental due process require-
ments enunciated in Mullane was fast becoming the accepted level of
review.68
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 9 Justice Marshall,
writing for the majority, analyzed the reasonableness of the Indiana
notice provisions in light of the developments since Mullane. In recog-
nizing that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment pro-
54. The requirement that owners of property keep themselves informed of recurring events
affecting their property, and if they do not, any loss suffered is their own fault.
55. Note, Requirements of Notice, supra note 10, at 1266.
56. See Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 752 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
57. Note, Notice by Publication, supra note 45, at 1509-10.
58. 351 U.S. 141 (1956)(mailed notice insufficient to an infirm party).
59. Id. at 146.
60. See. e.g., Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265 (Okla. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 100 (1973) (notice by publication regarding mineral rights).
61. See, e.g., Umatilla County v. Porter, 12 Ore. App. 393, 507 P.2d 406 (1973) (notice by
publication upheld).
62. E.g., Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414
U.S. 1059 (1973) (published notice of tax sale and right to redeem).
63. E.g., Dow v. State, 396 Mich. 192, 240 N.W.2d 450 (1976).
64. E.g., Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. Fugate, 210 Kan. 185, 499 P.2d 1101
(1972); Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448, 464 P.2d 177 (1970).
65. E.g., Johnson v. Mock, 19 Ariz. App. 283, 506 P.2d 1068 (1973); Laz v. Southwestern
Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69, 397 P.2d 52 (1964).
66. "[N]otice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address
are known or very easily ascertainable. . Laz, 397 P.2d at 56 (quoting Schroeder, 371 U.S.
at 212).
67. Note, Requirements of Notice, supra note 10, at 1266.
68. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (notice by posting, publication and
mailed notice not sufficient where defendant known to be infirm).
69. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
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tects the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, '70 the Court reaf-
firmed that a state must "provide notice reasonably calculated, under
all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 71
Citing Mullane as the controlling authority,72 the Court began by
declaring that a mortgagee does possess a significant property interest
which is substantially affected by a tax sale.78 Noting that a tax sale
has the potential to totally dissolve a mortgagee's security interest,7 4
the Court concluded that Mullane dictates that a mortgagee to given
"notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale."17 5
In disclaiming the sufficiency of notice by posting and publica-
tion7 6 the Court took note of the fact that such steps are primarily
undertaken to attract prospective purchasers to the tax sale,7 and fur-
ther, that such methods of notification are highly unlikely to come to
the attention of those with an interest in the property. 8 While noting
that the traditional bases of in rem jurisdiction allowed constructive
services on non-residents7 9 the Court stated that such constructive no-
tice had never been accepted as being sufficient to bind individuals in
actions in personam, 80 and that generally residents have been provided
with personal service even in proceedings in rem.81
Relying upon decisions rendered subsequent to Mullane, the Court
noted that publication had been held to provide insufficient notification
where the landowner's name was on the official records, 82 notice by
posting and publication was inadequate where the property owner's
name and address were easily ascertainable from the tax rolls,83 and
that even the posting of notice on a tenant's apartment door had been
found to be insufficient under certain circumstances.84
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2709 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).







79. Id. at 2711 n.3.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (condemnation
proceeding).
83. See, e.g.. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (notice by posting and
publication insufficient in condemnation proceeding).
84. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) (notices posted on the doors of tenants'
1984]
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In declaring that due process required adequate notice for sophisti-
cated creditors as well as those inexperienced in commercial transac-
tions,85 the Court concluded that "[n]either notice by posting and pub-
lication, nor mailed notice to the property owner, [was] means 'such as
one desirous of actually informing the [mortgagee] might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it.' ",86
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist,
dissented, 87 objecting to the majority's broad departure from prior deci-
sions by holding "that before the State conducts any proceeding that
will affect the legally protected property interests of any party, the
state must provide notice . . . by means certain to ensure actual notice
as long as the party's identity and location are 'reasonably ascertaina-
ble.' "" The dissenters protested the majority's proscription of the form
of service that a state should adopt,89 and yiewed the majority's actions
as an adoption of "a per se rule against constructive notice."9 Addi-
tionally, they objected to the potentially immense burden placed on the
state by the imposition of a duty to make reasonable efforts to locate
and notify any affected parties.91
The Mennonite decision represents a major extension of the Mul-
lane rationale, not only because it involves a direct application of Mul-
lane to tax sale proceedings, but also because the Court imposes a re-
quirement on a state to notify landowners, mortgagees, and "those with
a legally protected property interest."92
Indiana has already amended its code to provide notice to mortga-
gees,98 and Mennonite seems to require states such as Arkansas94 to
reevaluate their tax sale notice provisions to assure that due process
requirements have been satisfied. The ruling in Mennonite should be
apartments held insufficient where it was known that neighborhood children or other tenants re-
moved them).
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2712. "A party's ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does not
relieve the state of its constitutional obligation." Id.
86. Id. at 2711 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
87. Id. at 2712.
88. Id. (emphasis original).
89. Id. at 2713.
90. Id. at 2715.
91. Id. at 2714-15 (burden not limited to mailing notice, but state may have to check records
for each delinquent taxpayer to determine whether mortgage has been paid off or whether address
is dependable).
92. Id. at 2713.
93. See supra note 4.
94. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1128 (Supp. 1983) (providing for the state land commissioner
to mail notice only to owners of record, making no mention of mortgagees).
95. For a compilation of the statutes of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, see
[Vol. 7:437
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read as requiring mailed notice in virtually all proceedings adversely
affecting an interest in property where the person's name and address
are easily ascertainable. Although states will no doubt contend that this
will impose an enormous financial burden on already scarce resources,
it should be noted that the costs incurred in sending notice, particularly
in tax sales, can be added to the purchase price of the property. 96 Fur-
ther, the Court has emphasized that neither increased costs nor a
party's ability to protect himself relieves a state of its constitutional
obligation.97
Although the Court in Mennonite did not indicate whether its rul-
ing would be applied prospectively or retroactively, this is a major con-
sideration. Realizing that the Court in Linkletter v. Walker 8 granted
itself the power of prospective limitation, such a limitation to prospec-
tive tax sales may tend to retard the effectiveness of the principle which
the Court enunciated.
Although many will argue for prospective application to avoid de-
stroying the validity of existing tax titles, a retroactive application of
the principle prohibiting the deprivation of property without proper no-
tification may correct past violations and maintain consistency with the
spirit of the decision.9 9 Further, it should also be noted that a retroac-
tive application would not automatically destroy all existing tax titles.
Where the owner has abandoned the property, such titles would proba-
bly go without challenge. 10
There are also numerous other justifications for contending that
not all titles will be destroyed by retroactive application, particularly
since the present case presents an unusual situation in that the mortga-
gor continued to make payments to the mortgagee while neglecting to
pay the property taxes. In most instances, the property owner will pay
neither the taxes nor the mortgage, and the mortgagee will institute
foreclosure proceedings before a tax sale is required. Thus as a practi-
cal matter, there will not be many mortgages whose interests are termi-
nated due to tax sales.
Note, Notice by Publication, supra note 45.
96. Id. at 1515. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-1126 and 84-1130 (Supp. 1983).
97. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
98. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The Court announced that the exclusionary rule announced in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would be given only a prospective application, while stating
that in other cases, whether civil or criminal, the Court would "weigh the merit and demerits in
each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation would further or retard its operation." 381 U.S. at 629.
99. See Note, Notice by Publication. supra note 45, at 1516-17.
100. Id. at 1517.
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Further, although tax deeds are generally "not acceptable as a ba-
sis for title in Arkansas . . . .Nevertheless, a tax deed is color of title,
and may be accepted in conjunction with evidence of adverse posses-
sion.' ' 0 1 Since suits in Arkansas for the recovery of land must gener-
ally be brought within seven years, 102 it is clear that "the doctrine of
adverse possession would defeat challenges to most older deeds."103
Moreover, where a tax title is invalidated, the purchaser will still re-
cover the price paid, expenses and reasonable interest, while he would
only lose his windfall.10 Arkansas also has a two-year limitations pe-
riod on all actions challenging the sale of land for delinquent taxes,10 5
so it appears that a retroactive application would not have a devastat-
ing effect.
It is not immediately clear just how far a state must go to ascer-
tain the name and whereabouts of interested parties in various types of
proceedings. As a starting point, it appears that the present ruling is
limited to parties whose names are a matter of public record, 0 6 al-
though the state may have to resort to extra efforts if the address is not
also included.107
Since the case was decided under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, it would appear to be applicable to all "pro-
ceedings where notice must be given to persons whose interests are af-
fected," 108 although there will probably be exceptions for particular
101. Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, Proposed Arkansas Title Standards, 16
ARK. L. REV. 376, 384 (1961-62). Although color of title is not essential to acquiring title by
adverse possession, it does allow a party in active possession of a portion of the property covered
by the tax deed to be deemed in constructive possession of all of the property referred to in the tax
deed, whereas without the color of title provided by the tax deed the party would only be deemed
in adverse possession of the small plot he actually possessed. Further, since the payment of taxes
on unimproved and unenclosed land for seven years under color of title is deemed to be actual
possession of the property, it is evident that color of title can be an extremely important benefit
from having a void tax deed. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-101 and 37-102 (1976). See also Dierks
Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (1954) (details Arkansas law on adverse posses-
sion and importance of color of title); Bradbury v. Dumond, 80 Ark. 82, 96 S.W. 390 (1906)(deed
based on void tax sale gives color of title).
102. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-101 (1962).
103. Note, Notice by Publication, supra note 45, at 1517. See also Nunn v. Mitchell, 210
Ark. 422, 196 S.W.2d 576 (1946) (challenge to title acquired by adverse possession was barred,
notwithstanding that the defending party had not complied with notice requirements).
104. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1130 (Supp. 1983).
105. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1118 (1980).
106. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
107. Id. at 2711 n.4.
108. Fraser, supra note 22, at 316. Other situations in which a person other than the owner
may be entitled to notice include persons with an easement of record, persons with a leasehold
interest in the property, probate proceedings, divorce proceedings, and custody/adoption
PROPERTY
proceedings.109 Viewed in this light, the instant case seems to require
governmental and private parties to notify affected parties where their
names and addresses are known or on public record.
Jerry L. Malone
proceedings.
109. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.22, 11.29, and 12.18 (2d ed.
1977) (class actions generally excepted, but where damages are sought, notice must be given to
the entire class).
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